In numerous texts Leibniz claimed that while metaphysical necessity is inconsistent with free choice, moral necessity is not. A question naturally arises concerning what Leibniz took moral necessity to be. In a series of recent articles Michael Murray has argued that the concept of moral necessity Leibniz utilized is one developed and deployed by a group of 17th century Spanish Jesuits. This chapter argues that Leibniz's commitment to certain deep metaphysical principles suggests otherwise.

I appreciate Benson Mates's generous review of my book, and also the editor's willingness to allow me to comment on it. There is one point where Professor Mates attributes to me a view I did not intend to assert, although what I did say is so compressed that even I have had some difficulty divining my intentions. And it may well be that Professor Mates will find the view that I did intend to assert even less satisfactory than the view (...) that he attributes to me, which I did not intend to assert. (shrink)

There is much scholarly disagreement with regard to the program of the Enlightenment. Something in the vicinity of agreement is achievable provided one remains suitably vague. I intend to take advantage of that. One item that seems to me characteristic of the Enlightenment is the general (and admittedly, vague) idea that human reason is the ultimate arbiter in all matters concerning warranted human belief—matters of religion included. And I have no doubt that Leibniz’s philosophizing properly understood, contributes to that general (...) idea. In what follows, I concentrate on some aspects of Leibniz’s thinking that seem to me especially relevant to this theme. (shrink)

pt. 1. De dicto: Necessary and contingent truths, by G. W. Leibniz. New essays concerning human understanding, by G. W. Leibniz. Introduction to the critique of pure reason, by Immanuel Kant. On the nature of mathematical truth, C. G. Hempel. Two dogmas of empiricism, by W. V. O. Quine. In defense of a dogma, by H. P. Grace and P. F. Strawson. The a priori and the analytic, by A. Quinton. The truths of reason, by R. Chisholm.--pt. 2. De re: (...) Reference and modality, by W. V. O. Quine. De re et de dicto, by A. Plantinga. World and essence, by A. Plantinga.--Bibliography (p. 200-202). (shrink)

The point of these brief remarks is to indicate some of the topics discussed in Robert Adams’s book, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist. I have accepted an invitation to submit a detailed critical evaluation of the work to The Philosophical Review; I save detailed discussion for that occasion.